DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 298 205 UD 026 338

AUTHOR Kirst, Michael W.
TITLE The Federal Role and Chapter 1: Rethinking Some Basic Assumptions.
PUB DATE Oct 87
NOTE 18p.; In: Policy Options for the Future of Compensatory Education; see UD 026 334.
PUB TYPE Speeches/Conference Papers (150) -- Reports - Evaluative/Feasibility (142)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Compensatory Education; Educationally Disadvantaged; Elementary Secondary Education; Federal Aid; *Federal Programs; *Federal State Relationship; *Government Role; Program Administration; *Program Development; Program Evaluation; Program Implementation; School Districts; State Programs
IDENTIFIERS *Education Consolidation Improvement Act Chapter 1; Reagan Administration

ABSTRACT

In the 20 years since the major Federal program for the disadvantaged began, surprisingly little has changed from its original vision. It is now time to question some of the basic policies of Chapter 1 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act in view of the change in conceptions about the Federal role and the recent state and local reform movement. There have been the following alternative modes of Federal action for public schools: (1) general aid; (2) stimulation through differential funding; (3) regulation; (4) dissemination of research results; (5) provision of technical assistance to help build capacity at other levels of government and the private sector; and (6) exertion of moral suasion through the use of the "bully pulpit." The evolution of the Federal role is traced; under the Reagan Administration the bully pulpit--which affects the early stages of policymaking, and education research priorities and trends--has become the central government role. The implications of this for Chapter 1 are discussed. There is a need to reorient the Federal role from routine fiscal monitoring and data collection without obliterating the special services basis of Chapter 1 for a particular group of children. Recommendations for improving the Federal role are offered. A list of references is provided. (BJV)

****
* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *
****

ED298205

THE FEDERAL ROLE AND CHAPTER 1: RETHINKING SOME BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

by

Michael W. Kirst
Stanford University

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY
Peggy A. Richmond
Research & Evaluation Associates, Inc.
TO THE EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)."

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Office of Educational Research and Improvement
EDUCATIONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC)
X This document has been reproduced as received from the person or organization originating it.
☐ Minor changes have been made to improve reproduction quality.
• Points of view or opinions stated in this document do not necessarily represent official OERI position or policy.

UD026 338

THE FEDERAL ROLE AND CHAPTER 1: RETHINKING SOME BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

It is over twenty years since the major Federal program for the disadvantaged began, but surprisingly little has changed from its original vision. Regulations and targeting of aid have been tightened and loosened, while parents have come and gone as major policy participants. But the various amendments have been incremental around the same themes of a special program for special needs students that is separate and additional to the "regular program." A fundamental assumption was that something different (termed special services) was needed for the disadvantaged than the normal educational fare in terms of content and teaching methods. In parts of the country, however, disadvantaged children were hardly receiving any instruction at all in the early 1960s (Committee on Education and Labor, U.S. House of Representatives, 1985).

The writer was the first program assistant hired by the 1965 Title I director, John F. Hughes, and has also participated in administration of the program as President of the California State Board of Education. I believe that it is now time to question some of the basic Chapter 1 policies in view of the change in conceptions about the Federal role and the recent state and local education reform movement. But there is a danger that radical Chapter 1 surgery will vitiate the established program base that stands out for its fidelity to those original 1965 legislative objectives. In effect, a high risk, high gain strategy would be to merge Chapter 1 closer to the "regular academic core" program and focus on avoiding <u>educational supplanting</u> rather than fiscal compliance. The Federal role would feature curricular content that these special needs pupils should and do study, as well as effective classroom instructional strategies and practices. The historic Chapter 1 concern has been policing <u>fiscal supplanting</u> in order to prevent leakage of funds from the most needy children to their more fortunate classmates. The easiest administrative method to do this was by setting up special Title I classes and remedial teachers that received children "pulled out" of their classes for a period of time.

If educational supplanting becomes a key concern then the Federal role will change from fiscal audits and regulatory concern that now preserve a separate identifiable program. The new Federal role would focus on technical assistance, research, and the use of the bully pulpit to stimulate and disseminate linkages with the regular core academic program. The Federal role would not be prescriptive and regulatory in the areas of curriculum and instruction, but rather lead through exhortation, assistance, and teacher training.

In sum, a strategic change in the Federal role should be implemented. Before turning to this issue, we need to review the evolution of the strategies used to advance the current Federal role. The paper will conclude with several alternatives as a basis for thinking about future policy directions. A persistent theme will be that more needs to be done to improve the education of disadvantaged children

than revisions in fiscal regulations and special classes. The Federal role must include providing better regular classroom teachers who have the resources to make a difference and need not rely on pullout specialists. The paper will not address the appropriate level of Chapter 1 funding, but it is noteworthy that only 30 percent of the eligible children are now served.

Modes of Federal Influence

There have been basically six alternative modes of Federal action for public schools.

1. General aid: Provide no-strings aid to state and local education agencies or minimal earmarks such as teacher salaries. A modified form of general aid has been proposed by President Reagan. He would consolidate numerous categories into a single block grant for local education purposes. A tuition tax credit or voucher program is also a form of general aid. No general aid bill has ever been approved by the Congress.

2. Stimulate through differential funding: Earmark categories of aid, provide financial incentives through matching grants, fund demonstration projects, and purchase specific services. This is the approach of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) and Chapter 1. This paper will not cover the problems of reallocating Chapter 1 funds among schools and districts to reach the most needy pupils. New funding allocations per se do not change the mode used in the Federal role.

3. Regulate: Legally specify behavior, impose standards, certify and license, enforce accountability procedures. The bilingual regulations proposed by the Carter administration (and rescinded by President Reagan) are a good example. Chapter 1 has extensive regulations and merges strategies two and three.

4. Discover knowledge and make it available: Have research performed; gather and make other statistical data available. The Office of Educational Research and Improvement (OERI) performs the first function and the National Center for Education Statistics the second.

5. Provide technical assistance and build capacity at other levels of government or the private sector: Furnish technical assistance and consultants in specialized areas or curricular subjects. The Federal Office of Civil Rights will advise school districts who design voluntary desegregation plans. Chapter 1 builds a strong evaluation capacity in state education agencies (SEAs).

6. Exert moral suasion through use of the bully pulpit: Develop vision and question assumptions through publications, speeches, and a carefully orchestrated media campaign by top

officials. For example, Secretary Bennett has frequently called for more attention to the education role of parents.

The Reagan administration promotes the following basic changes in the Federal educational policy of the 1965-1980 era:

(1) from minimal support of private education to significant support;

(2) from a prime concern with equity to more concern with efficiency and state and local freedom to choose;

(3) from a larger and more influential Federal role to a mitigated Federal role;

(4) from mistrust of the motives and capacity of state and local educators to a renewed faith in governing units outside of Washington;

(5) from categorical grants to more unrestricted types of financial aid; and

(6) from detailed and prescriptive regulations to deregulation.

Despite the recent Reagan emphasis, however, the poorly defined value of promoting equal educational opportunity has been the most pervasive theme of Federal education policy. Its most obvious expression is through numerous categorical grants targeted to students not adequately served by state and local programs (for example, disadvantaged or handicapped). The Federal government has also attempted to stimulate educational reform through the Teacher Corps or demonstration programs such as women's equity and career education. The Reagan administration has scaled back aggressive Federal innovations in such areas. The categorical interest groups that are the major recipients of Federal policy will resist his basic policies, but the key will be whether they can form coalitions. The findings by Mosher, Hastings, and Wagoner (1981) are not optimistic for such alliances among these categorical groups:

> There is little evidence of common effort among the groups; the various categories of need tend to be strictly compartmented when demands are made for political remedies.
>
> . . . All of the interest groups have demonstrated, from time to time, effectiveness and sophistication in political maneuvering, a sophistication evident in their success at concentrating as much influence as possible, at the appropriate time, in a variety of policy arenas: the courts, particular state legislatures, the Congress, Federal agencies, and so on. (pp. 46-47)

The last comment indicates that the objectives of categorical interests such as the handicapped may lose out at one level of government only to succeed at another. It also suggests that the

legions of Title I specialists built up over the years will politically resist attempts to amalgamate them with the core curriculum.

The Evolution of the Federal Role

In 1950, when the U.S. Office of Education (USOE) was transferred to the Federal Security Agency, forerunner to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), it had a staff of three hundred to spend $40 million. Growth was slow and largely unrecognized. In 1963, forty-two departments, agencies, and bureaus of the government were involved in education to some degree. The Department of Defense and the Veterans Administration spent more on educational programs than the USOE and National Science Foundation combined. The Office of Education appointed personnel who were specialists and consultants in such areas as mathematics, libraries, school buses; these specialists identified primarily with the National Education Association (NEA). Grant programs operated through deference to state priorities and judgments. State administrators were regarded by USOE as colleagues who should have the maximum decision-making discretion permitted by categorical laws.

While the era of 1963-1972 brought dramatic increases in Federal activity, the essential mode of delivering services for USOE changed gradually. The differential funding route was the key mode, seeking bigger and bolder categorical programs and demonstration programs. The delivery system for these categories continued to stress the superior ability of state departments of education to review local projects. Indeed, the current collection of overlapping and complex categorical aids evolved as a mode of Federal action that a number of otherwise dissenting educational interests could agree on. It was not the result of any rational plan for Federal intervention but rather an outcome of political bargaining and coalition formation. Former USOE head Harold Howe (1967) expressed its essence this way:

> Whatever its limitations, the categorical aid approach gives the states and local communities a great deal of leeway in designing educational programs to meet various needs. In essence, the Federal government says to the states (and cities) "Here is some money to solve this particular program; you figure out how to do it . . . ." But whatever the criticisms which can in justice be leveled against categorical aid to education, I believe that we must stick with it, rather than electing general aid as an alternative. The postwar period has radically altered the demands we place on our schools; a purely local and state viewpoint of education cannot produce an educational system that will serve national interest in addition to more localized concerns.

An incremental shift in the style of USOE administration also came with expanded categories. The traditional provision of specialized consultants and the employment of subject-matter specialists were ended in favor of managers and generalists who had public

administration rather than professional education backgrounds. The states emulated the Federal model and decimated their capacity to provide leadership in curriculum content and teaching. These newer Federal and state administrators became more aggressive regulators and created a political backlash against Federal regulation that Ronald Reagan was able to highlight in his 1980 campaign. These managers were not experts in instructional strategies and rarely cognizant of the overall curriculum that disadvantaged children experience in classrooms.

Centrality of the Bully Pulpit Role Under the Reagan Administration

Previous administrations have used moral suasion or the bully pulpit to reinforce more direct regulatory, funding, and service efforts. For example, Commissioner of Education Sidney Marland's 1970 advocacy of career education was backed by a new grant program. However, the Reagan administration has featured this tactic of speeches, commissions, and advocacy by the Secretary and President as a primary mode of action. Although a relatively inexpensive strategy, significant personnel and financial resources have been targeted toward influencing public opinion and thereby impacting policy. In a self-assessment of his first term, President Reagan (1984) wrote:

> If I were asked to single out the proudest achievement of my administration's first three and one-half years in office, what we've done to define the issues and promote the great national debate in education would rank right up near the top of the list. (p. 2)

The Reagan administration's use of the bully pulpit in education is consistent with its new federalism philosophy that the state and local authorities and citizens are the proper and most effective means of action and change. Mr. Reagan has deliberately rerouted much of the responsibility for governing away from Washington. In that process, his use of the bully pulpit has been integral not only to promote devolution of authority but also to advocate "excellence" including discipline, merit pay, and prayer in the classroom.

In accord with the new federalism philosophy, a major goal of the administration has been to deregulate the myriad categorical programs that began in 1965. Reagan campaigned on a promise to dismantle the Department of Education in an effort to symbolize this decentralization of power. Likewise, in an interview with Educational Record, former Secretary of the Department of Education, Terrell Bell (1981), stated that he hoped, if nothing else, to be remembered as one who reversed the relentless trend toward Federal education control.

Ironically, it was the Democratic administration that enlarged the national education pulpit from which Education Secretaries Bell and Bennett have spoken. Shortly after the creation of the U.S.

Department of Education, an optimistic former Democratic Commissioner Harold Howe (1980) stated: "A Cabinet-level department lends importance to the Secretary's voice, which will influence the thinking of many persons about education's goals, practices, results, governance, and costs" (p. 446). However, there is still no overall Federal education policy spokesperson because education programs remain scattered throughout the government. For instance, there are major education initiatives in the National Science Foundation, the National Institutes of Health, the Veterans Administration, and the Educational Programs for Youth in the Department of Labor.

Certainly the most graphic example of this bully pulpit strategy has been the report of the National Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE) and subsequent follow-up activities. The Commission's report, A Nation at Risk, sold 70,000 copies during its first year, the Government Printing Office's best seller in recent years. The Department of Education estimates that approximately seven times that number, 500,000, copies were distributed within a year of the report's release. Extensive excerpts in national and regional periodicals, such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, and The Oregonian provided millions direct access to the report. The New York Times ran fifty articles mentioning the Commission's report within the first few months of its release.

The NCEE findings, as well as those of similar task forces and individuals, clearly captured the attention of Americans concerned about education. Whether the administration realized the potential of the Commission's work at its inception is unclear. However, once NCEE had established the tone, the President and the Secretary took full advantage of this rhetorical opportunity to advance their agenda. While at an obvious level the issue was one of return to quality, the "excellence movement" also has provided a vehicle for the administration to push the onus of responsibility for education back to the state, local, and parental levels.

President Reagan had a high level of involvement with the introduction of the report and subsequent activities. Among other things, the President visited schools around the country, participated in two regional forums, and addressed a plenary session of the National Forum on Excellence in Education, with consistent themes stressing quality, discipline, merit pay, and the virtues of homework.

The Department of Education scheduled various activities to maintain the momentum fostered by the reports and to encourage action at the state and local levels. The Department sponsored twelve regional forums and a National Forum on Excellence in Education. Secretary Bell designated most of his discretionary fund toward that effort and stated that a major portion of the budget was to be spent on the problems and priorities addressed by the commission report.

Upon the first anniversary of the release of A Nation at Risk, the Department disseminated a follow-up, The Nation Responds: Recent Efforts to Improve Education. The publication was at once an assessment and another push for continued action at the state and local

levels. The report cited glowing stories and statistics about the "tidal wave of school reform." After only a year, researchers were aware of 275 state level task forces on education, stimulated in part by NCCE. Forty-eight of fifty-one states and jurisdictions had adopted or were considering new high school graduation requirements. At that point, thirty-five states had approved new requirements.

The prevalence of the bully pulpit strategy is evident from a review of speeches, operational statements, and budgetary considerations. Other efforts have included the very visible "Wall Chart" (comparing resources and college entrance scores across states), Becoming a Nation of Readers, What Works, and First Lessons. Secretary Bennett (1985) described the role of the bully pulpit in promoting the work of American education as follows:

> The work is principally the American people's work, not the Federal government's. We, in Washington, can talk about these matters, comment on them, provide intellectual resources, and, when appropriate, limited fiscal resources, but the responsibility is the people's.

Assistant Secretary Finn (1986) wrote in the National Review:

> Third, and perhaps most remarkably in the "war of ideas" about education, the Federal Government is beginning to look like an asset rather than a liability. Washington is not promoting new programs or promulgating new regulations. It is amplifying the voice of common sense, taking issue with establishment folly, and emitting a steady stream of ideas and suggestions, facts and analyses, examples and interpretations that help arm state and local educators for the battles they are fighting.
>
> . . . To be sure it would be good to deregulate bilingual education, to convert the big Chapter 1 compensatory education program into an optional voucher, and to effect a handful of other changes in Federal Government policy. But leadership, backed by sound understanding and solid information, may be more important. (p. 36)

Finn goes on to emphasize that solid research is needed to overcome the "accumulated dopiness" of the educational establishment. Such research findings "need to be heralded with all the legitimacy of scientific research and all the amplification that a President and Cabinet Secretary can supply."

Issuance of the Wall Chart that compared state education outcomes exemplifies the Reagan administration's use of the bully pulpit strategy. "The publication of the 'wall chart' brought to the forefront the issue of state-to-state comparisons," wrote the report's authors. "On a political level, the attention given to the Secretary's wall chart makes inevitable future state-to-state comparisons on outcome measures." In a dramatic reversal, the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) approved a plan to conduct regular comparisons of the educational performance of the states rather than

permit the Federal government to preempt interstate performance comparisons. While initially opposed strongly to such techniques, the CCSSO is now determined to influence the sorts of performance measures used, including a de-emphasis on Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) comparisons. The CCSSO's new attitude about interstate comparisons suggests they would not resist as strongly in 1987 Federal leadership in curriculum and instruction as they did in 1965. Such Federal curricular leadership must be permissive and decentralized in the spirit of the bully pulpit role.

Assessing the Impact of the Bully Pulpit

Although the administration's use of the bully pulpit has been its centerpiece of education policy, there is almost no research on its effectiveness. An Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC) search revealed one piece which focused on the impact of task forces during previous administrations. A bully pulpit type strategy can have substantial impact on changing policymakers' assumptions or viewpoint about policy priorities. Such activities are effective in agenda setting and percolate indirectly into the policy process by changing assumptions and how people view a problem.

The Department of Education's assessment of the bully pulpit's impact has been handled more in a public relations vein than a scholarly one. The Department published The Nation Responds, but its primary purpose was to reinforce the administration's message of optimism and to encourage continued state and local effort. The following quotation is indicative of the report's tone: "deep public concern about the Nation's future created a tidal wave of school reform which promises to renew American education." Research on the impact of symbolism like "excellence" for guiding the policy agenda suggests the bully pulpit could be quite effective (See Jung & Kirst, 1986).

Not only does the bully pulpit strategy seem to have impact upon the early stages of policymaking, but it also has an impact upon education research priorities and trends through indirect means. More federally funded research has been directed at curricular content, academic standards, parent choice, and the excellence agenda as exemplified by the Federal regulations on the OERI Center competition. The same strategy could be employed to rethink the instructional and curricular assumptions surrounding Chapter 1.

Implications for Chapter 1

The Chapter 1 program has reflected this gradual shift in strategies for carrying out the Federal role. The program was the centerpiece of the equal opportunity focus and assumed that state and local educators could not be trusted to target scarce Federal dollars to the disadvantaged. The Federal view was that local political

concerns frequently would lead to diversion of Chapter 1 funds to less needy children. Therefore, the major Federal mode of delivery was through detailed regulation backed by field audits. There was a deep fear from 1965 to 1986 that some Title I money might spill over to the non-Title I kids in the class. Consequently, a separate administrative apparatus was created and sustained, composed of state and local Title I coordinators whose allegiance was antithetical to the core curriculum and the regular classroom teacher delivering Title I/Chapter 1 services. Chapter 1 coordinators have their own professional association and identities and meet separately from most classroom teachers in state and national conventions. Technical assistance and provision of services such as curricular models was abandoned by the late 1960s. The managers and auditors became the key Federal players and curriculum or teaching experts were shunted to other Federal divisions. Federal research efforts focused on regulations and compliance, with scant attention to the commonplaces of education--teaching, curriculum, and learning strategies.

This regulatory and distinct categorical Federal role was reinforced by a view that Chapter 1 was working and it was unwise and risky to shake up success. It was assumed that acceptable levels of compliance with Chapter 1 targeting and special services requirements were linked to achievement gains in the early grades among Southern Blacks. Indeed, a careful administrator could follow the Federal bully pulpit surrounding Chapter 1 in the 1970-1985 period and hear nothing about curricular content or how to teach these children. There was a Federal assumption that something educationally different needed to be done for these children, but the Federal government transmitted no clear message on what or how.

At a recent conference sponsored by the congressionally mandated study, several learning theorists proposed a 180 degree turn from the traditional Title I view--the new viewpoint is that nothing much different needed to be done for disadvantaged children in terms of instructional strategy and tactics. Harry Passow (1986) puts the research debate this way:

> Considering the controversy concerning the significance of cultural, language, and linguistic experiences of low-income and racial/ethnic minority children in beginning reading and other instructional areas, the omission of this literature could imply that these reviewers do not think that those differences make a difference with regard to curriculum and instruction of disadvantaged students. There are educators who believe that good reading instruction for middle-class standard English speakers (whatever that may encompass) is good reading instruction for all students regardless of mother tongue or dialect or family culture. There are educators who believe that there is such a thing as "dialect interference" and conflict between communication systems and those who view this notion as irrelevant in designing instruction. The equivocal nature of much of the research on grouping, both between-class and within-class, results in drawing very different conclusions about the outcomes of such practices. (pp. IV-250-251)

Despite this controversy, experts agree that we do know a lot more about instruction now than when most Chapter 1 programs were designed. Passow (1986) cites a paper written by Robert Calfee concerning reading which states, "Tracking, pullout programs, reliance on paraprofessionals to monitor remedial learning serve as barriers rather than facilitators to improving the curriculum of literacy for youngsters at risk" (p. IV-248). Calfee contends that Chapter 1 should be aimed at improving schools as educational organizations instead of programs targeted to the individual student. For instance, low-income students receive Chapter 1 services that differ from the regular curriculum and are less likely to develop literacy. Chapter 1 teachers place a stress on decoding and a neglect of comprehension, and ask students to sound out words rather than make informed guesses. According to Calfee, these are rare requests to justify an answer or provide appropriate feedback that is balanced between support and correction using appropriate pacing. Calfee (1986) hypothesizes that "if the curriculum was more straightforward . . . the amount of differentiation between children from lower- and middle-class backgrounds might be relatively small" (pp. IV-247-248).

The Federal role needs to catch up with recent research on curriculum and instruction that has increased our knowledge greatly in such areas as reading. Chapter 1 programs I observed spend too much time on sounding out words and too little on reading interesting passages. This does not mean that all pullout programs are bad and this strategy cannot be improved. Until regular classroom teachers are retrained, there will be a need for pullout strategies. The point is that both pullout and regular class teachers need a new vision of Chapter 1 curriculum content and improved instructional techniques. Too much time is spent in drill and practice approaches, and some pullout programs do a better job at higher order skills than regular class techniques.

Bill Honig (1986), California's Chief State School Officer, put the Federal administrative issues surrounding this reconceptualized learning approach in this way:

> Every student is entitled to a full, balanced curriculum. The Chapter 1 program should enrich the delivery of the instruction of this curriculum to eligible students. Instead, Chapter 1 is often operated as a separate remedial program, substituting a narrow, repetitious curriculum for a well-balanced core curriculum. Students eligible for categorical programs need the remedial instruction afforded them. It is important, however, that the students receiving needed remedial instruction do not miss the core curriculum. Otherwise they will only be exposed to a limited curriculum and experience another type of educational disadvantage. There is a need for some development work in this area to train teachers to help eligible students to master the base curriculum and to provide integrated learning experiences.

> . . . School effectiveness research reveals that poor, low achieving students benefit greatly from going to effective schools. Yet the participation of Chapter 1 students and staff in activities characteristic of effective schools is unnecessarily restricted by law. The isolation of Chapter 1 students and service providers undermines efforts to attain academic excellence in school. Planning for the use of Chapter 1 funds should be at the school level and constitute an integral part of the schools' total program. Classroom teachers and school leaders should be empowered to play the central role, with parents of eligible students involved as a safeguard against the misuse of funds. If we enhance school effectiveness at the same time we are addressing the needs of eligible students, every student will benefit from going to a better school. Current Chapter 1 provisions for schoolwide projects have proven to be too restrictive in this regard. Once a designated, reasonable percentage of a school population has been determined to be eligible for Chapter 1, the school should be allowed to coordinate all remedial resources, under an approved plan, in a manner which will uplift the entire school.

The 1983-86 education reform movement has featured a renewed emphasis on a core academic curriculum that emphasizes the more traditional subjects and higher order skills. This academic core has been deemed as essential for all pupils and relies on a continuity of skills and content. The Chapter 1 pullout and special services approach has not been featured as a necessary separate entity. An urgent necessity is blending Chapter 1 with this revitalized core, but it is difficult to do this with the separate cultural and administrative structure that has been institutionalized. Chapter 1 Technical Assistance Centers are mostly useless for this task because they focus on aggregate test data that is not useful for local education agencies (LEAs). At the end of this paper I suggest that these current Technical Assistance Centers be replaced with new units that stress curricular content and instructional strategies. There is an urgent need to retrain Chapter 1 classroom teachers in the approaches recommended by Calfee and Passow. There needs to be much more attention to the curricular content that disadvantaged pupils receive.

The Either/Or Curriculum Policy Syndrome

Curricular discussions in the United States have a disturbing tendency to oscillate between polar extremes. At one point we create new math and then revert to rote drill and practice. For a while there is a push for open classrooms, and then the topic drops off the policy agenda almost completely. High schools are urged to become shopping malls with a broad curriculum with many options, only to be pushed back to a required core of traditional subjects. The current re-examination of Chapter 1 pullout programs and classroom instructional strategies should not proceed from a naive belief that the current core curriculum for disadvantaged kids is just fine, and that they are primarily losing academic ground because they are missing

some of it. Henry Levin (1986) points out that even in the regular class the traditional notion is that "educationally needy students should be placed in slow, repetitive, remedial programs. Not only do these programs bore students, but they reinforce students negative self-images" (p. 1). A Federal role that focuses on these types of instructional issues is quite different from one that is keyed to fiscal audit trails. Core curriculum instruction needs to be more fast paced for Chapter 1.

What many disadvantaged pupils are missing is first-class, rapid-paced instruction from teachers who have confidence that such pupils can learn. This cannot be provided by simply reorganizing classroom structures or exhortation from the Federal bully pulpit. Jane David (1981) analyzes the current need in this way:

> What we need are ways of implementing what we know--ways of getting support for smaller classes and for putting some of the best teachers with these students. We need teachers who have high expectations, excellent diagnostic skills, and enough understanding of the backgrounds of their students to build on their existing knowledge and experience. . . . But abandoning all targeting and fiscal controls, especially in today's social and political climate, would translate into general aid, and lose the whole point of the program.

In other words, there is a need to reorient the Federal role from routine fiscal monitoring and data collection without obliterating the special services basis of Chapter 1 for a particular group of children. But rethinking the impact of fiscal controls on curriculum and instruction is only a starting point. Accountability needs to be reconstructed in a different manner that does not rely so heavily on aggregate achievement scores and separate audit trails. Chapter 1 is a marginal program in the local setting and provides a very small percentage of school funding. The Federal Chapter 1 role needs a new strategy for attracting and retaining good teachers and influencing teaching strategies, curricular content, and classroom behavior. Moreover, a revival of the summer programs that were featured in the 1960s would mitigate summer learning loss and provide a setting for more intensive and fast-paced instructional strategies during the regular academic year.

Implications for the Federal Role

In keeping with the new emphasis on the bully pulpit, a first approach could be for the Federal leadership to orchestrate a large-scale media campaign to change state and local orientations towards Chapter 1. This strategy would not rely on large increases in funds. It could include the specific core curriculum themes that Honig recommends, as well as research findings on how to integrate compensatory education within the regular classroom. The bully pulpit probably needs to be preceded by a major research synthesis as well as additional field studies. Federally funded research would focus

on math, English, science, and other subject fields in terms of the special needs of disadvantaged children. It is doubtful that such curricular integration and teaching strategies can be enhanced greatly by detailed regulations or new categorical funding earmarks. This level of Federal regulation within the classroom would be resisted strongly by state and local educators.

The initial Federal bully pulpit role needs to be backed up by a widespread technical assistance and network building focus that provides consultants to SEAs and LEAs. These technical assistance providers should be experts in curricular content as well as methods. They can be in regional centers and not necessarily Federal employees. Federal grants could be given to SEAs to develop better technical assistance capacity for instructional leadership. This would entail a switchback to the pre-1965 role of USOE subject matter specialists who are national leaders in their curricular and instructional fields. Part of Chapter 2 could be earmarked for increased state instructional leadership capacity. These new units would create locally based networks, coordinate field services, and produce curriculum handbooks for local consideration.

Still another component would include the Chapter 1 SEA program review strategies that carefully link the Federal categoricals with academic content and instructional strategies within the regular classes and core curriculum. The Federal government would design model ways to use Chapter 1 for schoolwide improvement plans. Federal policy should fund a major effort to retain classroom teachers to improve techniques for the disadvantaged rather than leaving them to rely on pullout remedial specialists. This strategy does not change Chapter 1 allocations and thereby create winners and losers who might oppose it on redistribution grounds. We do have several examples of teacher inservice projects that have been successful such as the California Writing Project.

This first strategy assumes a straight-line extrapolation of the current Federal role under Reagan without large funding increases. An alternative could be a return to the 1965-1980 approach of more regulations, field audits, and new earmarked subcategories. For example, a new compensatory education categorical could focus on the dark continent of educational policy--the junior high school. Separate funds could be provided for summer school for junior high pupils so that they can catch up in an accelerated setting. Almost all of Chapter 1 funds are spent in the elementary grades, but achievement begins to fall most dramatically in the middle grades. A new Federal initiative could focus on these transitional years where schools become departmentalized so that the pullout concept is not as major a problem in terms of content continuity. An alternative to junior highs as a separate categorical focus could be a drastic revision in the allocations among school districts to focus on the most needy, as suggested by Smith (1986). With an increased funding base, more districts could move funds into the junior high grades.

Still another option would be to continue primary reliance on the current Chapter 1 fiscal regulatory approach. This keeps in

place the administrative structure of state and local Chapter 1 coordinators as a key force for preserving the separateness of the program. Most of the current Chapter 1 coordinators are not subject matter or pedagogical experts, but are more attuned to administrative compliance issues. They would probably not be strong allies in the first option of a closer merger of Chapter 1 with the regular classroom teacher and academic core curriculum. The coordinator's entire professional socialization has been towards a need to safeguard Chapter 1's distinct identification. A possible compromise is: current fiscal accountability could be preserved between schools (including comparability), but within schools with very high concentrations of disadvantaged children the fiscal restrictions on schoolwide services would be dropped.

The Reagan administration's proposal for a Chapter 1 voucher has never received a serious hearing in the Congress, and the 1986 election makes it even less likely. This is a novel proposal that combines some aspects of the general aid role with a categorical approach. It is most likely, however, that the future Federal role in Chapter 1 will not involve a radical transformation, but rather will be an incremental move. The much heralded 1981 Act, in effect, merely repealed much of the regulatory underbrush that had built up from 1966 to 1980. It did not change any of the basic assumptions underlying the 1965 Act.

The time seems propitious now to reconsider some of the basic program assumptions. It will not be easy to blend a core curriculum approach, teacher training, and school improvement with financial accountability and targeting to the neediest pupils. Perhaps, this is the time to renew our search for differential treatment of states and localities, depending on whether they use the type of overall school site improvement strategy outlined by Odden (in press). States that develop an integrated curricular approach could have some of the strict fiscal tracking rules waived by the Education Department, and thereby merge their compensatory education strategy more closely with the core curriculum. LEAs that have very high concentrations of disadvantaged children could have different and less restrictive criteria for using Chapter 1 to reinforce the core curriculum, and more easily merge the program in the regular classroom. States could be encouraged to submit alternative plans for targeting Chapter 1, but with much closer relationships to state reform programs.

REFERENCES

Bell, T. H. (1981). T. H. Bell (Interview). Education Record, 62(3), 5-7.

Bennett, W. J. (1985, March 27). Address to the National Press Club, Washington, DC.

Committee on Education and Labor, U. S. House of Representatives. (1985). A compilation of papers on the twentieth anniversary of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (Serial No. 99-D). Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing Office.

David, J. (1981, August 18). Personal communication.

Finn, C. E., Jr. (1986, August). [Interview]. National Review, p. 36.

Honig, B. (1986, August 5). [Letter to Secretary Bennett].

Howe, H. (1967, May 22). National policy for American education. Speech to the seventy-first annual convention of the National Congress of Parents and Teachers, Minneapolis, MN.

Howe, H. II. (1980). Two views of the new Department of Education and its first secretary. Phi Delta Kappan, 61, 446-447.

Jung, R., & Kirst, M. (1986). Beyond mutual adaptation into the bully pulpit: Recent research on the Federal role in education. Educational Administration Quarterly, 22(3), 80-109.

Levin, H. (1986, October 3). Quoted in Stanford Daily, p. 1.

Mosher, E. K., Hastings, A. H., & Wagoner, J. L., Jr. (1981). Beyond the breaking point? A comparative analysis of the new activists for educational equality. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 3(1), 41-53.

Odden, A. (in press). How fiscal accountability and program integrity can be insured for Chapter 1. Berkeley, CA: Policy Analysis for California Education.

Passow, A. H. (1986). Curriculum and instruction: Reactions. In B. I. Williams, P. A. Richmond, & B. J. Mason (Eds.), Designs for compensatory education: Conference proceedings and papers. Washington, DC: Research and Evaluation Associates.

Reagan, R. (1984). Overview of education reform issues. In C. Marshner (Ed.), A blueprint for education reform. Washington, DC: Free Congress Research and Education Foundation.

Smith, M. S. (1986). Selecting students and services for Chapter 1: Reactions. In B. I. Williams, P. A. Richmond, and B. J. Mason (Eds.), Designs for compensatory education: Conference proceedings and papers. Washington, DC: Research and Evaluation Associates.